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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE RUPP, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
-v-

Case No. 16270

GRANTSVILLE CITY, et al.,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellants brought an action for declaratory injunctive relief enjoining the enforcement of certain provisions
of the respondents' ordinance entitled "Sewers," which provisions are cited as Chapter 22, Sections 31, 34, and 35 of the
Grantsville City Ordinances, as revised, and from enjoining
the enforcement of certain provisions of the respondents' ordinance entitled "Water," which provisions are cited as Chapter
28, Sections 13, 15, and 27 of the Grantsville City Ordinances,
as revised.
The appellants contend the respondents were without
necessary statutory authority to enact certain of these
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sections and that in other aspects the sections are unconstitutional in violation of notice and hearing requirements of due
process.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial of this matter was before the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, the Honorable Ernest F.
Baldwin, Jr., Judge, presiding.
At the close of evidence and argument, the lower court
granted the respondents' motion to dismiss.
RELIEF SOUGHT OH APPEAL
The appellants seek a reversal of the judgment of the
lower court by having th1s court construe and restrain the sections of the ordinances and their enforcement as being unconstitutional and unauthorized by statutes of the State of Utah
insofar as the sections of the ordinances purport to extend to
the respondents' powers which have not been granted them by the
legislature.
STATEUENT OF FACTS
In conjunction with an earlier ordinance relative to
a sewer system, which did not require mandatory hookups, in
1967 the respondents held a special election which failed to
give the respondents the authority to issue general obligation
bonds for the construction of a sewer system.

-2-
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In 1969 the respondents began prodecures for a
second special election to give the respondents the authority
to issue general obligation bonds for the construction of a
sewer system.
In an attempt to gain public approval through this
second special election, the respondents authorized the printing of pamphlets to inform the public that they now had coIImlitments for financial grants from the gederal government (Housing
and Urban Development - $198,000; Federal Water Quality Agency $67,000).
In these pamphlets the respondents informed the
appellants and others of the general public that the charge to
connect would be $250 and that those not connected would not
be charged, i.e., " ... tho~e people using the system and receiving benefits from it to pay for the construction."
The appellants and others had adequate septic tanks
and did not desire to connect.
The respondents discovered that to obtain the federal
grants they had to revise their sewer ordinance to provide for
mandatory hookups.
The ordinance being attacked in this case was amended
in 1969 to provide for mandatory hookups, at which time no such
statutory authority existed.

It was not until 1971 that the

legislature granted the respondents and other cities the statutory authority for mandatory hookups.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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After the second special election following the representations in the pamphlet, the respondents let the contract
for the construction of a sewer system.

Later it was dis-

covered the contractor had made a $150,000 mistake in his estimate and contract price.

Rather than bringing suit against

the contractor, the respondents waived that right and decided
to increase the connection fee from $250 to $350.

This action

was done after a public hearing before the respondents but not
by a vote by the people.
Thereafter, the respondents sent notices to the
appellants and others to the effect that it was mandatory that
they hook up to the sewer system and pay the increased connection fee plus monthly rates, or they would have all of the
water being used by them cut off as a means to effect enforcement of their mandatory hookup ordinance.
The appellants had their water turned off for refusal.

They were advised by counsel to pay under protest so

that they would not be deprived of water and then to determine
if this action should be brought, which it was and is now before this court on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RESPONDENTS HAD NO STATUTORY AUTHORITY
TO ENACT THE ORDINArlCE FOR HANDATORY HOOKUPS TO THE SEWER SYSTEM.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The respondent is a city.

And cities are in their

nature and purpose creatures, instrumentalities, or local
agents of the state to exist, function, or be annihilated
strictly at the will of the legislature for the convenient administration of government throughout the state.
Cities may exercise only those powers which have
been expressly granted by the legislature by general laws;
those powers which are reasonably implied as being necessary
to carry out those powers which have been expressly granted;
and those powers which are essential to the declared objects
and purposes of all cities alike created, not merely convenient, but absolutely indispensable.
§

(16 C.J.S. Const. Law

140(b); 62 C.J.S. Mun. Corps. §§ 107 and llO(b); 37 Am. Jur.

722; lMcQuillin, Mun. Corps. 387 (2ded.); lDillon, Mun.
Corps. § 237 at 448 (5th ed.); Utah Const. art. IX, § 5;
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 (1953); Rich v. Salt Lake City, 20
Utah 2d 339, 437 P.2d 690 (1968); Salt Lake City v. Allred,
19 Utah 2d 254, 430 P. 2d 3 71 (1967) ; al though reversed on rehearing on point of preemption, Salt Lake City v. Allred, 20
Utah 2d 298, 437 P.2d 434 (1968), wherein the cases of Kusse,
Leo, Charlier, Hoffman, Horne, and Doran, infra, were cited
with approval; Salt Lake City v. State Tax Cormn'n, 11 Utah 2d
359, 359 P.2d 397 (1961); Stevenson v. Salt Lake City, 7 Utah
2d 28, 317 P.2d 597 (1957); Ritholz v. Salt Lake City, 3 Utah
2d 385, 284 P.2d 702 (1955); Nasfell v. Ogden City, 122 Utah

-5-
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344, 249 P.2d 507 (1952); Nance v, Mavflower Tavern, 106 Utah
517, 150 P.2d 777 (1944); Duchesne County v, State Tax Comm'n,
104 Utah 635, 140 P.2d 335 (1943); Walton v. Tracy Loan and
Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724 (1939); Salt Lake City v.
Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938); Riggins v. District
Court of Salt Lake County, 89 Utah 183, 51 P.2d 645 (1935);
American Petroleum Co. v. Ogden City, 90 Utah 465, 62 P.2d 557
(1936); Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden City, 89 Utah 546, 58
P.2d 1 (1936); although reversed on other grounds by Rich v.
Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 339, 437 P.2d 690 (1968); Lehi City
v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P.2d 530 (1935); Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161 (1933); Salt Lake City v.
Bennion Gas & Oil Co., 80 Utah 530, 15 P.2d 648 (1932); Bohn v.
Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2d 591, 81 A.L.R. 215 (1932);
Morgan v. Salt Lake City, 78 Utah 403, 3 P. 2d 510 (1931); American Fork City v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 P. 249 (1930); Salt
Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 P. 234 (1923); Salt Lake
City v. Bernhagen, 56 Utah 159, 189 P. 583 (1920); Ogden City
v. Leo, 54 Utah 556, 182 P. 530 (1919); Salt Lake Citv v. Board
of Educ. of Salt Lake City, 52 Utah 540, 175 P. 654 (1918);
Zamata v. Browning, 51 Utah 400, 170 P. 1057 (1918); Tooele v.
Hoffman, 42 Utah 596, 134 P. 558 (1913); Salt Lake County v.
Salt Lake City, 42 Utah 548, 134 P. 560 (1913); American Fork v.
Charlier, 43 Utah 231, 134 P. 739 (1913); Salt Lake City v.
Doran, 42 Utah 401, 131 P. 636 (1913); Pleasant Grove City v.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Lindsay, 41 Utah 154, 125 P. 389 (1912); Salt Lake City v.
Howe, 37 Utah 170, 106 P. 705 (1910), Ann. Cas. 1912C 189;
Ifolden v. Clark, 20 Utah 382, 59 P. 524, 77 Am. S. R. 917
(1899); Ogden City v. Boseman, 20 Utah 98, 57 P. 843 (1899);
Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 P. 1, 45 L.R.A.
628 (1899); Ogden City v. Crossman, 17 Utah 66, 53 P. 985
(1898); Ogden City v. Bear Lake and River, etc., Co., 16 Utah
440, 52 P. 697, 41 L.R.A. 305 (1898).)
This view is well expressed in 1 Dillon, Municipal
Coroorations 154 (5th ed.):
It must now be conceded that the
great weight of authority denies
in toto the existence, in the absence of special constitutional
provisions, df any inherent right
of local self-government, which is
beyond legislative control. The
Supreme Court of the United States
has declared that a municipal corporation in the exercise of all
its duties, including those most
strictly local or internal, is but
a department of the State. The
legislature may give it all the
powers such a being is capable of
receiving, making it a miniature
State within its locality; or it
may strip it of every power, leaving it a corporation in name only;
and it may create and recreate
these changes as often as it chooses,
or it may itself exercise directly
within the locality any and all
powers usually committed to a municipality. So viewed its acts cannot
be regarded as sometimes those of
an agency of the State and at others
those of a municipality; but, its
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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character and nature remaining at
all times the same, it is great
or small according as the legislature shall extend or contract the
sphere of its actions.
The respondents in this case now on appeal have
never yet contended the law in this state to be contrary to
that which has been stated above.

In fact, the respondents

rely solely on Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-38 (1953) for their authority to enact the 1969 mandatory hookup ordinance, when such
express statutory authority was not given the respondents or
any city until the 1971 amendment of Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-38
(1953) .
The respondents do not rely on their so-called general welfare powers which are to be found in Utah Code Ann.
§

10-8-84 (1953).

Nor could there be reliance thereon, because

that statute merely authorizes cities to pass "all ordinances
necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all powers
and duties conferred by this chapter .... "

(Emphasis added.)

The general grant of power to enact ordinances to be
found in Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 (1953) is merely in aid of
the special grants of express powers elsewhere to be found in
the legislative statutes called general laws which are required
to have uniform application throughout the state (American
Fork City v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 P. 249 (1930)) and
does not enlarge or annul any special grant of express power.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2d 591, 81 A.L.R.
215 (1932).)
Therefore, the respondents were without statutory
authority to enact the mandatory hookup ordinance under attack
in this appeal, because such ordinance was enacted in 1969,
two years prior to the 1971 statutory authority.

And inter-

estingly enough, the respondents to this very day have not yet
enacted a valid mandatory hookup ordinance even though they
have had such authority since 1971.
The appellants do not contend the respondents were
without authority to construct, maintain, and operate a city
sewer system.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-38 (1953) since its incep-

tion in 1898 has provided such authority.
What the appellants do contend is that the respondents by the ordinance relied on do not have the authority to
compel the appellants to hook up to the sewer.
The appellants recognize and accept the burden of
establishing the invalidity of the ordinance under attack.
(Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975).)

This

burden is met through two parallel lines of reason.
First, the general construction of doubtful city
authority, both within this state and others, is that where
there is a reasonable doubt concerning the existence of a particular authority of a city, that doubt should be resolved
against the city, and the authority should be denied.

(Nance

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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v. Mayflower Tavern, 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773 (1944); Pacific
County v. Sherwood Pacific, Inc., 567 P.2d 642 (Wash. App.
1977); Salinas v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 72 Cal.
App. 2d 494, 164 P.2d 905 (1946); Fullerton v. Central Lincoln
People's Utility District, 185 Ore. 28, 201 P.2d 524 (1948).)
Secondly, there would be no need for the legislature
to amend Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-38 (1953) in 1971, expressly
granting the authority to cities for mandatory hookups if that
authority were already implicit in the pre-amendment version of
the statute.
Thus, the very fact the legislature in 1971 amended
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-38 (1953) supplies the necessary consensus that the pre-amendment version authority for mandatory
hookups was sorely in doubt at best and more likely was intentionally and entirely lacking.
Hence, following the general constructions of doubtful city authority and the need for express statutory authority,
the authority for mandatory hookups the respondents claim by
the 1969 ordinance should be denied.
Furthermore, another well-established rule of construction is that, in the absence of any express statutory
provision to the contrary, the enumeration of some express
authority within a statute (e.g., to provide for a sewer system
prior to 1971) implies the exclusion of all other authority
within that statute (e.g., no mandatory hookups until after
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the 1971 amendment).

(62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations§ 120;

City of Tulsa, Okla. v. Midland Valley R.R., C.C.A. Okla.,
168 F.2d 252; Arnold v. City of Chicago, 387 Ill. S32, S6 N.E.
2d 79S; City of Bloomington v. Wirrick, 381 Ill. 347, 4S N.E.
2d 8S2, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 7S6, 63 S. Ct. 117S, 87 L. Ed.
1709; Van Eaton v. Town of Sidney, 211 Iowa 986, 231 N.W. 47S,
71 A.L.R. 820, 43 C.J. 197, n. 19.)
Also, where there is the enactment of subsequent legislation containing a specific grant of authority (1971 mandatory
hookup amendment) which authority is kindred to that contained
in prior legislation (sewer system), the prior legislation containing a general grant of authority usually suggests the conclusion that the subsequent specific grant of authority was
not in the prior legislation.

(Salt Lake City v. Towne House

Athletic Club, 18 Utah 2d 417, 424 P.2d 442 (1967).)
And preference should be given subsequent statutes
over prior statutes where there is a conflict.

(Nelden v.

Clark, 20 Utah 382, S9 P.2d S24; Pacific International Express
Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 7 Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d 549.)
Finally, where statutes are conflicting, the more
specific takes precedence over the general (Rammell v. Smith,
S60 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977); University of Utah v. Richards,
20 Utah 4S7, S9 P. 96; 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 2S7; State v.

__

Rice , 110 Ariz. 210, Sl6 P.2d 1222 (1973); In re Smart, S4
Haw. 2SO, SOS P.2d 1179 (1973).)
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In conclusion, it must be conceded the respondents
through the 1969 ordinance did not have authority for mandatory
hookups to the city sewer system, because the legislature never
provided that authority until its 1971 amendment of Utah Code
Ann. § 10-8-38 (1953).
Therefore, the appellants were wrongfully compelled
to hook up to the sewer system, pay connection fees and monthly
fees or have their water services discontinued.

The appellants

should be able to again use their septic tanks if so desired
and receive refunds of all fees heretofore paid by virtue of the
invalid 1969 mandatory hookup ordinance and other ordinances
related thereto.

And all of this whether or not such fees were

paid under protest, because the ordinances under which the fees
were paid were and still are invalid.

(Wilson v. Heber County,

111 P.2d 147 (Utah 1941).)
POINT II
THE BOND ELECTION WAS INVALID BECAUSE THE
RESPONDENTS INDUCED THE APPELLAi."iTS BY
MISREPRESENTATIONS.
Of course, if this court finds the ordinances discussed in Point I of this brief are without authority, then the
respondents cannot compel the appellants to pay fees of any
amounts pertaining to mandatory hookups.
This point, though brief, goes further and contends
the appellants need not pay any connection fees because the
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pamphlets stated the charge to connect would be $250 and that
those who did not connect would not be charged.
The appellants chose not to connect but were not
only compelled to hook up but were charged $350 rather than
the $250 represented as being the fee to connect.
The case of Utah Savings and Trust v. Salt Lake City,
99 P. 255 (Utah 1908) stands for the proposition that if erroneous statements were made with respect to the bond election,
and the plaintiffs can make a showing that they and others were
induced by reason of such improper statements to vote for the
bonds, then the validity of the election can be examined by
the courts.
The case most on point with the instant case is
Ricker v. Board of Educ .. of Millard County School District,
396 P.2d 416 (Utah 1964).

There this court examined the

effect of the "explanatory brochure" concerning a school bond
election and the misleading statements contained therein.
Since this court found no deceit, fraud, or corruption on the
part of the school board, it held against the plaintiffs.
The appellants in the instant case, however, contend
the pamphlet contained the misrepresentations stated and made
the bond election invalid and unconstitutional for lack of due
process and fair opuortunity to vote.

(U.S. Const. amends. V

and XIV.)
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POINT III
THE APPELLANTS HAVE BEEN DENIED EQUAL
PROTECTION OF LAW IN THAT THE RESPONDENTS
HAVE NOT APPLIED THE ORDINA.c~CES TO ALL IN
LIKE SITUATIONS.
The appellants have been compelled to hook up to the
sewer system and pay fees while the respondents have not even
done so themselves as to all properties owned by the respondents, and without having others within the city do so, where
the sewer could be but has not been constructed because of
costs, and not inaccessibility, all of which constitutes select
law enforcement, amounting to the denial of constitutional
equal protection of the laws.

(U.S. Const. amend. XIV.)

POINT IV
THE ORDINANCES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS WHERE THEY
PROVIDE FOR WATER TERMINATION WITHOUT
HEARINGS.
Assuming without admitting that Revised Grantsville
City Ordinances, Section 22-31 (R.G.O.

§

22-31), the mandatory

hookup ordinance enacted in 1969, although the legislature
never expressly authorized same until 1971, is deemed by this
court to be valid, the appellants still contend Revised
Grantsville City Ordinances, Section 28-27 (R.G.O.

§

28-27),

the water termination ordinance, is still unconstitutional in
that it fails to provide for prior hearings as required by due
process of law.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-14-

The second paragraph of R.G.O. § 28-27 begins by
stating, "Persons applying for connection

The appellants

never applied for connection because they resisted the mandatory hookup provision of R.G.O. § 22-31.
The last paragraph of R.G.O. § 28-27 provides:
If any part of the account for
either sewer or water becomes
delinquent, as in this Code provided, the water service shall
be discontinued by the City
until all delinquencies have
been paid in full including the
reconnection fee.
The appellants had their water turned off because
they refused to pay the mandatory hookup fee and the monthly
sewer fees thereafter.

The .respondents sent letters of demand

for such payments but held no hearings before terminating all
water services to the appellants.
The respondents refused to reconnect water services
to the appellants until satisfactory arrangements for payment
had been made.

It was because of this the appellants were ad-

vised by counsel to pay such fees under protest so that their
water services would be resumed until this matter could be decided through the courts.
A recent case directly in point with the instant case
is Koger v. Guarino, 412 F. Supp. 1375 (D.C. Pa. 1976).

In

that case a class action for declaratory injunctive relief was
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brought, contending that certain termination procedures of the
city water department violated the due process clause of amendment XIV of the United States Constitution.
The district court there found at p. 1386:
. . . a water user has a legitimate
claim of entitlement to continued
water services which is a property
interest to which the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
applies.
Having determined that due process applies, the court
then addressed the question as to whether the procedures
adopted by the defendant water department in connection with
the termination of water services were in compliance with the
requirements of the due process clause.

The court noted that

the fundamental requirement of due process is "the opportunity
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."
(At p. 1387.)

Since the ordinances under which the defendant

water department was acting did not require a hearing prior to
termination of water services, the court concluded at p. 1388:
the pre-termination procedures
employed by the defendants are inadequate to satisfy the requirements
of the due process clause.
And the court further concluded at p. 1389:
Due process requires a hearing prior
to the termination of essential
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services such as water and sewer
and making payment of all delinquent water and sewer bills
a condition precedent to a hearing is not sufficient.
Therefore, since in the instant case, neither R.G.O.
§§

22-31 nor 28-27 require a hearing prior to the termination

of water and sewer services, both ordinances are unconstitutional under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.
The distinction of a class action suit is of no significance, because if the ordinances are unconstitutional or
otherwise without authority, they are invalid, unenforceable,
and no vehicles through which fees may be collected lawfully.
Any such fees collected must be refunded whether or not paid
under protest.

(Wilson v. Weber Co., 111 P.2d 147 (Utah 1941).)
CONCLUSION

The decision of the lower court should be reversed
with a declaratory judgment by this court that the respondents
acted without authority through their ordinances of mandatory
hookups (R.G.O. § 22-31) and water termination (R.G.O. § 28-27),
because of the absence of express legislative authority and
in violation of constitutional due process.
Furthermore, this court should order the respondents
to refund all unlawfully collected fees and permanently enjoin
the enforcement of both ordinances and any others which flow
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-17-

therefrom for their provisions which are in conflict with
statutory and constitutional requirements stated herein.
DATED this 4th day of June, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,

HAJ.'1SEN AND HANSEN
250 East Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellants
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I hereby certify that two copies of the fore.going
brief of appellants were mailed to Edward A. Watson, Tooele
County Attorney, Tooele County Courthouse, Tooele, Utah 84074,
this
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day of June, 1979.
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